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ARTICLE 
The Determinants of Direct Corporate Lobbying in the EU: a Multi-
dimensional Proxy of Corporate Lobbying 
Vannoni, Matia 
School of Arts and Social Sciences, University College London 
Executive summary 
This article argues for a more thorough analysis of the dynamics of corporate lobbying within the 
European Union (EU). While there is broad consensus among scholars on the emergence of a new 
type of European lobbying, studies have not sufficiently addressed the underlying economic 
rationale. Indeed, many authors emphasise the shift towards a system based on direct lobbying, 
however, these concentre only on systemic and non-economic causes. Direct lobbying dynamics 
are perceived mainly in two ways: either as a consequence of a conscious political strategy of the 
European institutions in response to the ‘interest overload’ (Coen, 2007) of the mid-1990s (e.g. 
Broscheid and Coen, 2003; Coen, 1998) or as a normal phase of the development of interest 
group populations (e.g. Berkhout and Lowery, 2010; Gray and Lowery, 1996). Advocating an 
economics based  analytical approach to European corporate lobbying, this contribution to the 
debate provides one of the very first attempts to uncover the influence of economic factors on 
direct corporate lobbying by building on the seminal work proposed by Bernhagen and Mitchell 
(2009). 
 
These authors, very familiar with the American tradition of corporate lobbying studies, were the first 
to apply a ‘standard model of corporate political behaviour’ to the European context by examining 
the various determinants of direct lobbying. This article goes further: it analyses the empirical 
database constructed by Bernhagen and Mitchell (2009), with a multi-dimensional proxy of 
corporate lobbying. Indeed, the main contribution of this study is in its analysis, namely the 
operationalisation of the dependent variable ‘direct lobbying’. It proposes a multi-strategy/multi-
venue operationalisation of the dependent variable aiming to overcome the pitfalls which 
characterise dichotomous and uni-dimensional operational definitions, in order to answer the 
research question: ‘What are the economic determinants of direct corporate lobbying in the EU?’ 
Such a multi-dimensional operationalisation of the dependent variable has required the unpacking 
of some of the elements taken for granted in the discussion on corporate lobbying. The discussion 
argues that the researcher needs to take into consideration the various direct lobbying strategies 
and their relative weights (i.e. the multi-strategy operationalisation 1). For example accreditation to 
the EP is not equal to the establishment of a company representation office in Brussels. 
Furthermore, another possible level of action of a firm’s strategy, namely the industry one, should 
also be considered (i.e. the multi-venue operationalisation 2): direct lobbying should be analysed as 
a preference over other lobbying approaches rather than in absolute terms.  
The findings show how such an expanded operationalisation casts light on the economic 
determinants of European corporate lobbying. First of all, the Olsonian argument finds empirical 
support: industry concentration determines lobbying strategies, indeed. Secondly, asset 
mobility/specificity influences a firm’s preference to lobby directly vis-à-vis other venues.  
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The Determinants of Direct Corporate Lobbying in the EU 
This section supplies a brief overview of the Olsonian tradition of lobbying studies and of the 
endogenous tariff literature. The former identifies in the degree of industry concentration a crucial 
element affecting corporate political strategy: concentrated production segments markets thus 
creating favourable environments where firms may overcome the typical problems connected to 
collective action. The latter emphasises the importance of production factors and their relative 
endowments. Indeed, depending on the endowment of production factors, trade induced 
adjustment costs are imposed upon factors (i.e. capital or labour) or industries. Accordingly, 
assuming (explicitly, e.g. Furusawa and Lai, 1999 or implicitly, e.g. Bhagwati, 1992) lobbying as a 
substitute for adjustment, coalitions form either along factoral lines or industry lines. In addition, 
other minor approaches considered relevant for the analysis are taken into consideration.  
 
Four main hypotheses derive from the research question formulated above thus identifying four 
economic determinants of direct lobbying: industry concentration, firm size, asset specificity and 
foreign investments. These hypotheses will then be operationalised into explanatory variables3 to 
be tested against the dependent variable. Worthy of note is that also private rents are listed 
amongst the explanatory variables because, although they are not economic determinants in the 
proper sense, they are directly linked to direct lobbying Another type of hypotheses differentiated 
according to the nature of the variables they give rise to, namely control variables4, is inferred. 
These represent those factors associated with the activity of the firm regardless of the venue of 
lobbying: even though they are not directly linked to direct lobbying, they can skew the analysis if 
not taken under control.  
Industry Concentration and Collective Action 
Collective action problems, in the Olsonian conception, have been the dominant leitmotif of 
empirical research in the American tradition over the last three decades (Baumgartner and Leech, 
1998; Lowery and Gray, 2004). Indeed, since the pioneering works of Esty and Caves (1983), 
Munger (1988) and others, measuring market structure via concentration ratios has become a 
standard analytical practice. Accordingly, concentration ratios have come predominantly to the fore 
as the main operational definition of market structure. Firms are incentivised to act collectively 
since their political weight augments. Conversely, where markets comprise large numbers of small 
firms producing in dispersed industries, heavy collective action problems lead the firm to act 
individually. The hypothesis inferred is as follows: 
H-e1: Ceteris paribus, firms acting in dispersed industries will be more likely to lobby directly 
Despite the theoretical appeal, the Olsonian argument has hitherto received little empirical support 
(Lowery and Gray, 2004; Hansen et al, 2005; Ozer and Lee, 2009). Hansen et al (2005) review 
several well known studies which attempt to establish a correlation between industry concentration 
and firm political activity. That none of them has found any form of relevant correlation speaks 
volumes. Moreover, this hypothesis has also been operationalised and tested in the European 
context by Bernhagen and Mitchell (2009) with limited results. Therefore the remainder of this 
paper will operationalise the dependent variable, namely direct lobbying, in a novel way. The 
objective is to investigate in a possibly more rewarding way whether the Olsonian argument finds 
support in the European lobbying context. 
Previously a range of different analytical devices have been tried. This paper proposes a more 
sophisticated operationalisation of corporate lobbying. Hansen et al (2005) criticise the normal 
dichotomous conception of corporate lobbying. Close in spirit to the study of electoral politics, they 
argue in favour of the categorisation of political behaviours. In fact, just as electoral behaviour 
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studies differentiate across a wide spectrum of types of participation, Hansen et al (2005) advocate 
an ordering of the different strategies employed by firms. As a result, they create an ordered 
categorisation of corporate participation to test the validity of the Olsonian argument in a more 
reliable manner. The same rationale will be applied below where the concept of participation is 
operationalised to fit the European context.  
Ozer and Lee (2009) go further by giving theoretical foundation and empirical testability to the 
differentiation between direct and collective lobbying. This study embraces the concept of ‘venue 
shopping’5 (Baumgartner and Jones, 1993) by criticising the counterpoised relation between 
individual and collective action that has characterised the empirical research in this field. The 
interaction between levels of participation assumes a central position in determining firms’ political 
strategy and attention shifts to a theoretical framework determining firms’ preference for one level 
of participation rather than another. In other words, individual action is conceptualised and 
operationalised in terms of preference, rather than in terms of a dichotomy vis-à-vis collective 
action. In this vein, the researcher can control the incentives for direct lobbying. The next section 
will apply this rationale to the analysis of European corporate lobbying.  
Recent developments in the studies on the logic of collective action in corporate lobbying are also 
characterised by another aspect. Indeed, Olson’s theory of collective action assumes a fortiori the 
feasibility and even the preferability of collective action. Scholars have started to (in the majority of 
cases, implicitly) challenge this assumption by introducing the division between collective and 
private goods into sectoral studies (e.g. in lobbying dynamics within determined manufacture 
industries, Godwin and Seldon, 2002) and then into broader approaches (e.g. Hansen et al, 2005; 
Lowery et al, 2008; Ozer and Lee, 2009; Godwin et al, 2008). In fact, ceteris paribus (i.e. 
regardless of the structure of the market) firms are incentivised by individual rents to act alone in 
the political arena. Unfortunately, public goods are not easily isolated from private ones, even in a 
rent seeking lobbying system such as the American one. The applicability of such an approach to 
the European reality, characterised by regulatory rent seeking lobbying (Coen, 2007; Coen, 2009; 
Fligstein and Stone Sweet, 2002), deserves further discussion. 
Resource Dependence Theory 
In the European Union, where the ‘political currency’ is represented neither by votes nor by the 
amount of money a firm can allocate to the campaign of a candidate, the issue of the size of a firm 
is more complicated. Nevertheless, there is a sort of ‘belief’ among European scholars that a firm’s 
resources determine its political strategy. Even more implicit is the assumption that this is usually 
associated with the choice of a given political strategy: large firms prefer to lobby alone. This 
‘belief’ is either implicit or explicit (e.g. Coen, 2007; Coen and Richardson, 2009; Eising , 2007; 
Bernhagen and Mitchell, 2009) in a great amount of works on European corporate lobbying without 
any attempt to provide any proper theoretical basis6. This stream of thought contradicts the 
Olsonian tradition by presenting opposite assumptions: individual action is here a fortiori conceived 
as preferable provided that a firm may afford it. Accordingly two hypotheses are inferred: 
H-e2: Ceteris paribus, large firms will be more likely to lobby directly 
H-c1: Ceteris paribus, large firms will be more likely to lobby both directly and collectively at 
industrial level 
These hypotheses have been operationalised and tested by many American scholars and most 
extensively in the European realm by Bernhagen and Mitchell (2009) with positive results without, 
however, addressing due attention to the measurement of the dependent variable. Indeed, as will 
be illustrated below, scholars have hitherto fallen short in considering a firm’s preference for the 
level of action and in constructing a multi-dimensional proxy of direct lobbying. In fact it is 
reasonable to assert that large firms will have the resources to employ a wider array of strategies 
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than small ones. As a result, ceteris paribus large firms will be involved more in direct lobbying 
dynamics than small ones in absolute terms. Nevertheless, the aim of an effective analysis should 
be to reveal whether large firms prefer direct lobbying dynamics to collective ones thus controlling 
for the latter.  
Endowment-based Trade Models and Adjustment Costs 
The type and intensity of trade induced adjustment costs are derived from the characteristics of 
production factors. Assuming that the stakes of a firm depend on the intensity with which 
production factors are utilised along with the availability and costs of substitutes and the mobility of 
those factors (Alt et al, 1999), two main models are found in the literature (e.g. Alt and Gilligan, 
1994; Gilligan, 1997): the Stolper-Samuelson (or Heckscher-Ohlin) theorem and the Ricardo-Viner 
theorem. The former refers to the scenario where factors (or assets) are mobile, namely the costs 
of reallocating them between industries are negligible. Accordingly, international trade bears the 
same effects on the rents of particular factors (i.e. wages or capital rents) regardless of where they 
are employed. The Stolper-Samuelson model envisages that an increase in trade raises the 
returns of the factor with which a country is abundantly endowed (Gilligan, 1997; Alt et al, 1999; 
Rogowski,1989). In this scenario, trade coalitions form along factoral or class lines (Gilligan, 1997; 
Alt et al, 1999). The Ricardo-Viner model assumes that factors are tied to the industry where they 
are employed (Alt et al, 1999) thus envisaging non trivial adjustment costs for import competing 
industries. Accordingly, trade policy coalitions form along industry lines.  
Worthy of note is that collective action considerations, though being clearly more serious in a 
Stolper-Samuelson scenario since entire classes are supposed to coalesce, have always been 
neglected by these models (Gilligan, 1997). Indeed, the latter only aim to identify the conditions 
whereby interests of economic actors are similar. As a consequence, it is necessary to merge 
these models with the Olsonian argument: the former reveal how actors coalesce with each other 
and the latter foresees the collective action problems actors are likely to encounter. This is not 
completely unfamiliar to the literature, but it has hitherto been confined to the analyses of single 
case-studies (e.g. to US trade policy, Gilligan, 1997 or to the Norwegian subsidies to national 
industry, Alt et al, 1999). The hypothesis inferred is thus: 
H-e3: Ceteris paribus, firms acting in industries characterised by asset mobility will be more likely 
to lobby directly 
After arguing for the necessity of unifying the assumptions of the Olsonian school and of the 
endogenous tariff literature, another development is of crucial importance in this field. It seems 
unreasonable that the role of factor specificity in determining coalitions among economic actors 
must be confined to trade policy lobbying. Other applications may be found: Alt et al (1999) apply 
this scheme to the demand for subsidies on the part of Norwegian industrial sectors in the 1970s. 
As  underlined by Alt et al (1999 p. 114) ‘though political science abounds with studies of lobbying, 
including lobbying by firms, we believe the application of trade theory and the measurements of 
firm characteristics we use represent a fruitful extension of a long empirical tradition’. In a similar 
vein, the next section will apply the concept of asset specificity to lobbying in the context of 
European decision-making as a whole and not exclusively to trade policy. The assumption is 
straightforward: the owners of the production factors who face potential losses due to an increase 
in competition will (at least partly) lobby instead of assuming adjustment costs, and the two models 
described above foresee how they will do it. Since the (formal) completion of the Single Market, 
trade between Member States has been regulated by a series of measures ranging from standard 
setting and procurement legislation, through Single Market directives to dispositions which 
indirectly affect competition, such as environmental policy. These regulations have the same 
characteristics as traditional trade policy as conceived by factor-endowments theories: they 
influence the way costs and benefits realign between different economic actors within and between 
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two or more countries. In conclusion, this hypothesis represents a novel attempt to extend the 
analytical concept of asset specificity beyond the scope of trade policy lobbying. 
Industrial Organisation Theories 
Asset specificity has also been identified as a crucial factor in determining corporate political 
strategies by scholars  drawing on industrial organisation theories (e.g. Ozer and Lee, 2009; Alt et 
al, 1999). Indeed, asset specificity determines long-term contracts along with firm organisation and 
therefore, the firm is incentivised to act in the political arena in order to secure its own environment 
(Ozer and Lee, 2009). The owner of specific assets is usually more involved in joint production and 
in the vertical structuring of its activities (Alt et al, 1999): vertical integration and long-term 
contracts make the firm more embedded in its environment. This scenario increases adjustment 
pressures and therefore, the firm facing potential losses increases expenditures on contractual 
activities that can reduce such losses. Among these activities Alt et al (1999) list lobbying. It is 
worth noting that whereas Alt et al (1999) apply this logic to test whether asset specificity leads to 
an increase in lobbying activities regardless of the level of action, Ozer and Lee (2009) employ 
asset specificity as a moderator of the negative relation between industrial concentration and 
individual action. In the latter case, firms with specific factors lobby directly. The following section 
embraces both these assumptions: 
H-e3(bis): Ceteris paribus, firms acting in industries characterised by asset specificity will be more 
likely to lobby directly  
H-c2: Ceteris paribus, firms acting in industries characterised by asset specificity will be more likely 
to lobby both directly and collectively at industrial level 
Furthermore, another scenario where the firm is so embedded in its environment that it is 
incentivised to act alone is identified: when the firm is highly involved in international joint 
production with a series of arrangements with foreign firms. Then: 
H-e4: Ceteris paribus, firms involved in high foreign investments will be more likely to lobby directly 
Regulatory Exposure 
As already illustrated, several authors (e.g. Ozer and Lee, 2009; Hansen et al, 2005; Godwin et al, 
2008) emphasise the importance of the division between public and private goods. Private rents 
impart benefits to a single actor exclusive of others, whereas collective rents are non-excludable, 
namely benefits are evenly allocated amongst a group of actors (Hansen et al, 2005). In the 
American context, indeed, firms are moved predominantly by rent seeking (Ozer and Lee, 2009). 
Individual government contracts represent an incentive for the firm to act alone in the political 
arena. Conversely, collective rents incentivise firms to coalesce and act as a united actor. 
Accordingly, the hypothesis is: 
H-e5: Ceteris paribus, firms highly involved in the delivering of private rents will be more likely to 
lobby directly 
Apart from the already mentioned considerations on the analytical difficulties in clearly 
distinguishing private goods from public ones, the applicability of this approach to the European 
context involves immense difficulties. Bernhagen and Mitchell (2009) operationalise the European 
involvement in a sector as a relevant factor. The logic is straightforward: the more EU legislation is 
active in a sector, the more the firms in that sector will lobby. One caveat must be considered 
though: the two authors do not consider the level of action relevant, in other words EU involvement 
determines the action of the firm, being individual or collective lobbying. Whether the division 
between collective and individual goods can be applied to the European regulatory rent seeking 
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system of lobbying is the focus of the following section, which illustrates the analytical problems in 
the operationalisation of this hypothesis. Bernhagen and Mitchell’s (2009) conception has been 
maintained: 
H-c4: Ceteris paribus, firms acting in industries highly affected by EU regulation will be more likely 
to lobby both directly and collectively at industrial level 
Data and Measurement 
This section presents the data set utilised and how the hypotheses shown above are translated 
into relationships among variables. After some initial considerations on the database used and the 
modifications made to it, the identification and the operationalisation of the variables follow.  
The Data Set 
This study builds on the valuable database provided by Bernhagen and Mitchell (2009)7 for a 
specific reason. At the time of writing this data set represented the first and only attempt to analyse 
the economic determinants of European corporate lobbying. Accordingly, it is the best context  to 
employ the analytical devices outlined above. By utilising the same data, this clearly demonstrates 
not only the applicability of a multidimensional operationalisation of corporate lobbying to the 
European domain, but also the necessity. 
The data set is drawn from Forbes Global 20008 and comprises the 2009 largest firms in 2005 
representing 50 countries and 27 industrial sectors. The database was modified in many regards to 
fit this work: some variables were ignored, some added and others were operationalised differently. 
For convenience, Bernhagen and Mitchell’s (2009) variables which are to be employed in the 
analysis below, along with their proxies and sources, are shown in Table 19. The data set was also 
limited to European firms. As a result, the reduced data set has 479 European firms, from 12 
countries and involving 27 industries. Reducing the observations creates problems. Nevertheless, 
three considerations drove this decision. First, whilst there are no widely adopted guidelines on the 
minimum number of observations a quantitative analysis must rely on, 479 observations represent 
a significant number. Second, the distribution of the variables does not change drastically due to 
such a modification: all the 27 economic sectors are still present, for instance. Indeed, also 
Bernhagen and Mitchell (2009) themselves explore this option without skewing results. Third, 
practical considerations on the operationalisation of variables were taken into account: consistency 
in the measurement of indicators is always desirable for reliable research.  
(Table 1) 
Adding Variables 
This section illustrates and operationalises the variables to be integrated into Bernhagen and 
Mitchell’s (2009) database. Indeed, the novel theoretical approaches applied and the relative 
hypotheses inferred necessitate additional variables. Since for the Olsonian argument and the 
resource dependence theory the relevant variables (respectively, industry concentration and firm 
size) were already operationalised and measured (see Table 1), this section deals with the 
remaining models. It is worth noting that the operationalisation of the variables hereafter focuses 
on the industry level and not on the individual firm level for two reasons. First of all, the concepts 
introduced make sense exclusively when employed at that level: in the economic literature asset 
specificity is always associated with industries and not individual firms. Secondly and accordingly, 
data are available only at industry level. The same rationale lies behind the operationalisation of 
several variables in the study by Bernhagen and Mitchell (2009). 
Factor-endowments Trade Theories and Industrial Organisation Theories  
Despite starting from different perspectives, both factor-endowments trade models and industrial 
organisation theories indicate asset specificity as a determinant of corporate political action. 
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Consensus reigns in the literature (e.g. Alt et al, 1999; Ozer and Lee, 2009) over the  
operationalisation  of the abstract concept of ‘asset specificity’ into two proxies: R&D expenditures 
and job mobility. Indeed, the former represent capital specificity whereas the latter labour force 
specificity. Furthermore, R&D expenditures also represent an indicator of the stake a firm has in its 
environment according to the industrial organisation approach (Ozer and Lee, 2009). Accordingly, 
asset specificity regarding capital was operationalised into the ratio of R&D expenditures over 
value added. Data were drawn from Eurostat for each industry in each of the countries contained in 
the dataset and assigned to firms accordingly: Business Enterprise R&D Expenditure (BERD) has 
been divided for Gross Value Added (GVA) at basic prices. The ratios for eight years, namely from 
1999 to 2006, were calculated and then averaged over the period. The correspondence between 
the different classification methods constituted the most challenging problem addressed along the 
entire process of data gathering. Indeed, for what regards this variable, data on BERD and GVA 
were classified according to the NACE Revision 1 system. This was rather similar to that utilised in 
the database, nevertheless, great effort was made to ensure the right correspondence between 
differently classified economic activities for each observation. For instance, in this particular case 
‘insurance’ in Bernhagen and Mitchell’s (2009) database was associated with a generic ‘financial 
intermediation’.  
The concept of asset specificity on the side the labour force is more difficult to operationalise. Alt et 
al (1999) identify job mobility with the assumption that high variations in the labour force of a sector 
reveal asset mobility. Nevertheless, job mobility is a multifaceted phenomenon, involving 
movements between employers (job-to-job mobility); between occupations and steps on the career 
ladder (occupational mobility); between different types of contracts; and in and out of employment 
(employment mobility) (Danish Technological Institute, 2008). Factor-endowments models indicate 
frictions in the reallocation of the labour force between different sectors as a relevant indicator for 
adjustment costs. Accordingly, this refers to the level of closeness characterising the labour market 
in a given sector vis-à-vis those in the other sectors. In empirical research analytical considerations 
must be balanced with operational ones. Indeed, perfect measurements for this variable would be 
the specific flows of the labour force across industries, thus focusing only on job-to-job mobility, 
and job tenure within sectors, which ‘is measured by the length of time workers have been in their 
current or main job or with their current employer’ (OECD, 2007). Since no data divided per 
economic sector are available for this proxy, job mobility was measured through the Industry 
Labour Input Index available in the Eurostat database (again, for each industry in the countries 
comprised in the dataset). This index indicates the percentage of the change in the gross number 
of employees per industry compared to the corresponding period of the previous year. Data were 
transposed into absolute terms, as this study is interested only in the intensity of the variation and 
not in its sign. Again, this was measured for a period of eight years (from 1999 to 2006) and 
averaged for this period. Problems related to classification methods arouse also in this case, as 
this index was categorised according to the NACE Revision 2. For instance ‘aerospace’ was in this 
case associated with ‘manufacture of other transport equipment’.  
Along with asset specificity, industrial organisation theories identify another relevant determinant of 
a firm’s political action. Indeed, the net of foreign investments and contracts with foreign firms in 
which a firm is embedded incentivises the firm to lobby directly in order to secure the environment 
where it acts. The level of assets an individual firm has abroad was operationalised into the level of 
FDI stocks in a given industry. Accordingly, data on FDI stocks (comprising equity capital and 
reinvested earnings plus other FDI capital) for each European MS vis-à-vis the others and for each 
sector were drawn from Eurostat. Consistently with other data in the dataset, FDI stocks were 
measured for the year 2006. Difficulties in comparing different databases emerged since data on 
FDI stocks referred to the NACE Revision 1. Nevertheless, a more accurate correspondence was 
possible in this case since the level of aggregation of available data was lower. As a result, in this 
case it was possible to associate ‘aerospace’ with ‘manufacturing of aircraft and spacecraft’.  
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Regulatory Exposure 
As shown above, several authors close to the American tradition (e.g. Ozer and Lee, 2009; 
Hansen et al, 2005; Godwin et al, 2008) emphasise the division between private and public rents 
delivered by the political system as a determinant of corporate political action. In a rent seeking 
system, such as American lobbying, the operationalisation of this concept is troublesome, but 
feasible. Conversely in a regulatory rent seeking system, such as European lobbying, this process 
is not straightforward. Furthermore, the literature is not of help in this case since the concept of 
private and public rents has hitherto not been applied to the European context. Nevertheless, this 
part operationalises this determinant building on the following assumptions. Bernhagen and 
Mitchell’s (2009) variable labelled ‘EU involvement’ is associated with the concept of private 
regulatory rent. The concept of regulatory rent or regulation as a good has already been employed 
by Hansen et al (2005). The rationale is that the times a firm has been mentioned in European 
court cases and in European regulatory proceedings is utilised as a proxy of European Union 
involvement in the environment of an individual firm. Accordingly, the more a firm is involved in the 
European system as a single actor, the more it can benefit or lose as a single actor being thus 
incentivised to act individually.  
Conversely, the more the EU is involved in a sector, the more the firms in that sector can benefit or 
lose as a collective actor thus being incentivised to act collectively. This is the logic behind a public 
regulatory rent. As a consequence, a measure of the European involvement in a sector is needed: 
for each sector in the database an estimation of the staff working on issues closely related to it was 
drawn from the organisation chart of EU Commission staff10. Accordingly, more accurate measures 
of the involvement of the EU in a specific sectors were taken rather than considering as a proxy the 
entire staff of the DG officially in charge (as proposed by Mahoney, 2004). For instance, the 
relevant DG for the sector ‘aerospace’ is the DG ENTR and therefore, according to Mahoney’s 
(2004) measurement the value of EU involvement would be 770, namely the number of employees 
of such a DG. Nevertheless, only a portion of those 770 officials deal directly with the aerospace 
sector: only the ones in the DG ENTR D.4 and in the DG ENTR H for a total of 136 employees. 
Furthermore, taking as an example ‘chemicals sector’ the staff dealing with these issues is 
employed both in the DG ENTR, namely DG ENTR G, in the DG ENV, namely DG ENV D , and in 
the DG RESEARCH, namely DG RESEARCH G.3. This results in a more detailed measurement of 
the proxy of public regulatory rent results. Other considerations on the suitability of this concept for 
the European domain are left to the results of the empirical analysis. Table 2 illustrates the 
statistical characteristics of the variables mentioned above. 
(Table 2) 
Analysis 
After having operationalised and measured the relevant determinants of corporate political action 
this section proposes two operational definitions of direct lobbying each of which with slightly 
different characters. Such a multidimensional  operationalisation  of the dependent variable aims to 
overcome the issues which characterise dichotomous and uni-dimensional operational definitions.  
Direct Lobbying: a Multi-strategy Proxy 
Hansen et al (2005) identify two different strategies according to which firms lobby directly in the 
US system: lobbying for an individual candidate running for elections and soft-money contributions 
to political parties. Furthermore, Alt et al (1999) in their analysis of the ‘Norwegian case’ recognise 
the necessity of differentiating the frequency at which firms contact political actors. Under this light, 
this section operationalises the dependent variable ‘direct lobbying’ as an ordinal variable using the 
dichotomous ones identified by Bernhagen and Mitchell  (2009). An operational condition must be 
met in order to construct such a variable: the values of the ordered variable must be mutually 
exclusive and collectively exhaustive (Borooah, 2002). Table 3 illustrates the procedure whereby 
this novel variable, labelled ‘ordered direct lobbying’, was from Bernhagen and Mitchell’s (2009) 
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data. The variable ‘ordered direct lobbying’ assumes six values: from value 1 (i.e. ‘no direct 
lobbying’) to value 6 (i.e. ‘very high direct lobbying’). For instance, if a firm is not accredited to the 
EP, it does not have a full-time European affairs representative and it has not established a 
company office in Brussels, the firm at stake is given the value 1 associated with ‘no direct 
lobbying’. Needless to say, the weight assigned to ‘Brussels office’ in the construction of this new 
variable is superior to the one assigned to ‘EP lobbyist’, for instance. Table 4 illustrates the 
characteristic of the dependent variable. 
(Table 3) 
(Table 4) 
Since the dependent variable represents the coding of qualitative outcomes and it assumes more 
than two values with an inherent order two regression methods are appropriate: the ordered logit 
and the ordered probit (Borooah, 2002). The difference between these two methods is rather 
technical and no guidelines driving the choice on theoretical grounds are present (Greene, 2000): 
in a logit distribution standard errors are logistically distributed whereas in a probit one they are 
normally distributed (Vasisht, 2007). An ordered logit method was chosen in order to be in line with 
Bernhagen and Mitchell’s (2009) analysis. 
(Table 5) 
As illustrated in Table 5, the hypothesis relating size with direct lobbying is verified since the 
estimated coefficient is statistically significant and of the right sign. Accordingly, taking two firms 
equal in all characteristics, the larger one is more likely to be involved in direct lobbying than the 
smaller one. Nonetheless, the strength of the variable size in this model is rather low. The reason 
being that the multi-strategy operationalisation of the variable ‘direct lobbying’ supplies a 
comprehensive overview of the phenomenon to be analysed including also strategies not directly 
linked to the resource availability of a firm. If direct lobbying is exclusively associated with the 
establishment of a company office in Brussels or the appointment of a European affairs 
representative, it can easily be predicted that firm size will matter. In fact, these two represent 
rather costly strategies. Accordingly, a researcher must rely on the complete spectrum of strategies 
a firm may employ and assign them the due weight. As a conclusion, whilst size retains its status 
of determinant of direct lobbying, its strength is significantly scaled down. Resource dependence 
theory atones for its shaky theoretical grounds in the empirical realm thanks to an operational 
definition of direct lobbying comprising the different strategies a firm can employ. The hypothesis 
which puts into relation the delivery of private rents with direct lobbying is sustained. The estimated 
coefficient of this explanatory variable is of the expected sign.  
Direct Lobbying: a Multi-venue Proxy 
Although the model above furnishes a comprehensive analysis of the phenomenon of direct 
lobbying by considering the various strategies employed by firms, direct lobbying, in fact, should be 
analysed in relative terms vis-à-vis other lobbying venues. Accordingly, the factors determining 
direct lobbying as a preferable strategy must be isolated. Ozer and Lee (2009) in their analysis of 
the lobbying dynamics characterising the American manufacturing industry employ as a dependent 
variable corporate ‘relative’ direct lobbying. It should be noted that American lobbying is a more 
‘observable and measurable’ reality than the European one in many regards: for instance, the 
highly regulated practice of Political Action Committee (PAC) contributions facilitates 
operationalisation . With these analytical advantages, Ozer and Lee (2009) compute the ratio 
between PAC contributions via industrial associations and PAC contributions devolved as 
individual firms as the dependent variable. European reality does not facilitate the  
operationalisation  of corporate relative direct lobbying: in the European lobbying context proxies of 
the actual action of interest groups, such as the PAC contributions, are very difficult to extrapolate. 
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As a result, the analysis will focus on the number of industry associations. The next part will 
operationalise direct European lobbying as a preference over collective action through European 
industry associations. 
Bernhagen and Mitchell’s (2009) variable ‘industry associations’, measuring the number of trade, 
industry or employers’ Euro groups per sector, was utilised to operationalise the dependent 
variable analysed in this section. The number of company representation offices in Brussels 
representing firms in a sector was divided for the number of industry associations in that sector: a 
multi-venue proxy of corporate lobbying at industry level results. This dependent variable was 
labelled ‘direct lobbying over European’. This shifts the focus of analysis to the industry level. 
Accordingly, all the other variables were adjusted for that level: the average size of firms in a sector 
was computed, for instance. Table 6 represents the results of the calculations for the dependent 
variable ‘direct lobbying over European’.  
(Table 6) 
Four variables are found to be statistically significant: industry concentration, job mobility, EU 
involvement (public rents) and EU involvement (private rents). Industry concentration is negatively 
correlated with direct lobbying: this is in line with the prediction of the Olsonian argument. Indeed, 
thanks to the multi-venue operationalisation of direct lobbying employed in this study it is 
demonstrated that the more an industry is concentrated the more the firms producing therein prefer 
collective action rather than direct lobbying. From the regression model it can be inferred that job 
mobility is positively associated with direct lobbying. Industrial organisation theories state that 
asset specificity is associated with a higher involvement of firms in the European arena both 
directly and at industry level. This hypothesis is falsified because asset specificity influences the 
involvement in direct lobbying and industry level lobbying in different degrees. Conversely, this 
finding is in line with the argument deriving from the fusion of the assumptions of the factor 
endowments trade theories and of the Olsonian tradition: in an asset mobility scenario coalitions 
should form along factoral/class lines, but, as the latter are characterised by huge collective action 
problems, the firm lobbies alone. This is another confirmation of the empirical support the Olsonian 
argument finds if a multi-venue proxy  of corporate lobbying is employed. 
From the regression model it can be induced that private regulatory rents supplied by the EU are 
negatively associated with direct lobbying. Indeed, given the  operationalisation of direct lobbying 
as a ratio over industry lobbying at European level, EU private rents are associated with a high 
involvement in industry lobbying. Furthermore, despite being statistically significant, the strength of 
the effect of  EU public regulatory rents is negligible. This casts doubts on the applicability of the 
division between public and private regulatory rents to the European context. Nevertheless, the 
fact that in this model such a relationship is very weak is in line with the general assumption that a 
firm embarks more heavily in lobbying practices at European level when its environment is heavily 
affected by EU legislation, regardless of the lobbying venue. Accordingly, the division between 
public and private goods must be set aside (at least until a more effective  operationalisation is 
excogitated) though the general concept of EU involvement as a determinant of a firm’s action at 
European level (being direct or collective lobbying) is maintained.  
The  operationalisation  of direct lobbying as a ratio over industry lobbying at European level 
emphasise some aspects. First of all, firm size is not statistically significant. This variable, after 
being scaled down by the analysis of the different lobbying strategies, is completely nullified by 
taking into consideration the other European venue a firm may exploit to lobby. Accordingly, both 
the hypotheses associated with resource dependence theory do not find any empirical support in 
this study. The disproportionate role assigned to the size of a firm as a determinant of corporate 
lobbying (and even direct corporate lobbying) by many scholars can be attributed to the 
investigative weakness uncovered by this analysis: a uni-dimensional  operationalisation  of direct 
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lobbying. Furthermore, the  operationalisation  of the division between public and private regulatory 
rents, although being theoretically appealing, proves to be analytically unfeasible in the European 
context. Indeed, the markedly regulatory character of the role of the EU in firms’ environment 
represents a strong obstacle. Nevertheless, with its innovative theoretical considerations this study 
can pave the way for future research: more work should be devoted to the operationalisation of this 
concept. Unsurprisingly, the level of EU involvement in a sector incentivises firms to act at 
European level exploiting both the lobbying venues available.  
Conclusion 
The contribution of this study is twofold. On the theoretical side, the main economic theories on 
corporate lobbying are transposed from the American lobbying system to the European one: the 
Olsonian argument and industrial organisation theories are brought in. Furthermore, the scope of 
analysis of trade policy lobbying theories is widened arguing that they can be appropriate also for 
the interest representation system as a whole and not only circumscribed to trade policy. 
On the analytical side, two main novelties are introduced in order to analyse European corporate 
lobbying in its multifaceted character: a multi-strategy and a multi-venue perspective. The several 
strategies characterising direct lobbying are considered and a specific weight is assigned to each 
of them. Moreover, the various venues a firm can exploit to lobby the EU are taken into 
consideration. As a consequence, a theoretically and empirically balanced analysis of the 
economic structure of incentives determining firms’ political action is presented. 
As a conclusion, the structure of economic incentives driving firms’ political action can be illustrated 
as follows. For firms, if the various lobbying strategies characterising direct lobbying and its 
intensity are taken into consideration, resources do play a decisive role, though perhaps less 
decisive than that suggested in the literature. The role of resources is cancelled out if the different 
venues via which a firm can lobby the EU are considered. Accordingly, resources are relevant with 
respect to direct lobbying in absolute terms, but if direct lobbying is analysed as a preference over 
the other European lobbying venues they are not. Concerning factors at industry level, asset 
specificity/mobility determines a firm’s preference to lobby directly vis-à-vis other venues: the 
assumptions of the factor-endowments trade theories (with the contribution of the Olsonian 
argument) are demonstrated. Moreover, if direct lobbying is operationalised as a preference over a 
collective technique the Olsonian argument finds empirical support.  
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Tables 
Table 1: Bernhagen and Mitchell (2009) Variables 
 Proxies Sources 
Direct Lobbying Brussels office European Public Affairs Directory 
2006 European affairs representative 
EP lobbyist 
Size Sales Forbes Global 2000 (December 2005) 
Profits 
Regulatory 
exposure 
Appearances in the EU court cases 
and in the regulatory  proceedings of 
the Commission 
CONECCS database, available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/civil_society/conec
cs/index.html [Accessed 19 March 
2006]; EUR-Lex case law; available 
at: http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/en/index.htm [Accessed 
6 February 2006] 
Concentration Four-firm ratio Forbes Global 2000 (December 2005) 
Control 
variables 
(sectoral level) 
Associations per industry European Public Affairs Directory 
2006 National associations 
Source: Online Appendix 2 of Bernhagen and Mitchell (2009) available at http://www.abdn.ac.uk/~pol209/data.htm 
[Accessed 10 August 2011] and Bernhagen and Mitchell (2009). Author’s own compilation. 
 
Table 2: Added Variables   
 Mean Standard 
deviation 
Variance Coefficient of 
variation 
FDI 83.43435 195.2873 38137.14 2.34061 
R&D intensity 5.12e+09 1.02e+11 1.05e+22 20.00494 
Job mobility 2.317333 2.381583 5.67194 1.027726 
IIT 79.36732 11.13709 124.0349 .1403234 
EU involvement 
(public rents) 
328.2359 260.3885 67802.17 .7932968 
Source: Author’s own calculations and compilation. 
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Table 3: ‘Ordered Direct Lobbying’ Variable: Procedure 
Bernhagen and Mitchell’s (2009) variables ‘Ordered Direct 
Lobbying’ variable European affairs  
representative 
 
EP lobbyist Brussel
s office  
0 0 0 No direct  
lobbying 
1 
0 1 0 Very low direct  
lobbying 
2 
1 0 0 Low direct 
lobbying 
3 
1 1 0 Medium direct  
lobbying 
4 
1 0 1 High direct  
lobbying 
5 
1 1 1 Very high 
direct  lobbying 
6 
Source: Author’s calculations and compilation. 
Table 4: ‘Ordered Direct Lobbying’ Variable: Characteristics 
 Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Variance Skewness 
‘Ordered Direct Lobbying’ 1.99789 1.767093 1 6 3.122617 1.545064 
Source: Author’s calculations and compilation. 
Table 5: ‘Ordered Direct Lobbying’ 
‘Ordered Direct Lobbying’ Coef. Std. Err. z P>z [95% Conf.Interval] 
Size .0524839 .0129751 4.04 0.000 .027053 .0779147 
Industry Concentration 2.845379 2.10405 1.35 0.176 -1.278484 6.969242 
R&D intensity 7.51e-09 1.99e-07 0.04 0.970 -3.82e-07 3.97e-07 
Job mobility .1943854 .1401619 1.39 0.165 -.0803268 .4690977 
FDI .001344 .0007603 1.77 0.077 -.0001461 .0028341 
EU involvement (public rents) 18.14091 4.004934 4.53 0.000 10.29138 25.99044 
EU involvement (public rents) -.0000291 .0010052 -0.03 0.977 -.0019993 .0019412 
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Table 6: ‘Direct Lobbying over European’ 
‘Direct Lobbying over 
European’ 
Coef. Std. Err. t P>t [95% Conf.Interval] 
Size .0017725 .0022678 0.78 0.436 -.0027085 .0062535 
Industry Concentration -1.363538 .3971036 -3.43 0.001 -2.148178 -.5788993 
R&D intensity .0022438 .0032137 0.70 0.486 -.0041063 .0085938 
Job mobility .1313687 .0209903 6.26 0.000 .0898939 .1728436 
FDI -.0000694 .0001588 -0.44 0.663 -.0003832 .0002444 
EU involvement (public rents) .0006119 .0001837 3.33 0.001 .000249 .0009748 
EU involvement (private rents) -3.827108 .8548873 -4.48 0.000 -5.516285 -2.137932 
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Notes 
                                                 
1
 The word ‘strategy’ refers to the manner whereby an actor deploys its resources in a practical way within a given 
venue. For instance, within the venue ‘European direct lobbying’ a firm can appoint a European public affairs 
representative, establish a company representation office etc. 
 
2
 The word ‘venue’ is preferred to the word ‘level’ because the former bears a broader meaning not restricted to the 
categorisation sub-national, national, supra-national (in this case, European). 
3
 The principal hypotheses, namely the ones from which explanatory variables will be derived, are labelled as follows: H-
e1, H-e2, H-e3 etc. 
4
The hypotheses from which control variables will be derived are labelled as follows: H-c1, H-c2, H-c3 etc. 
5
 This term was coined in a study on US lobbying in nuclear policy carried out by Baumgartner and Jones (1993). It 
indicates the framing of an issue in order to adapt it to the most receptive governance level. In European lobbying studies 
this term has come predominantly to the fore since the mid-1990s (e.g. Baumgartner, 2007; Broscheid and Coen, 2007) 
and it has been associated with the shift in the access points utilised by interest groups. 
6
 This accusation refers to ‘the simple resource-based perspective that ignores critical resource dependencies [and] that 
it assumes that interest groups are always prepared to modify and Europeanize their strategies as soon as their material 
self-interests would require or their resources would enable them to do so’ (Beyers and Kerremans, 2007 p.464 
emphasis added). 
7
 Available at http://www.abdn.ac.uk/~pol209/data.htm [Accessed 10 August 2011]. Information on each variable is 
available in the Online Appendix 2 http://www.abdn.ac.uk/~pol209/data.htm [Accessed 10 August 2011]. I am particularly 
grateful to Prof. Bernhagen, who kindly allowed me to utilise such a data set. 
8
 http://www.forbes.com/2005/03/30/05f2000land.html [Accessed 22 August 2011]. 
9
 For details on the measurement of these variables consult directly Bernhagen and Mitchell (2009). 
10
 Available at http://ec.europa.eu/staffdir/plsql/gsys_page.display_index?pLang=EN [Accessed 15 September 2011]. 
